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This Essay explores an alternative to one of the pillars of contract law, that
obligations arise only when there is “mutual assent”—when the parties reach consensus over the terms of the transaction. It explores a principle of “no-retraction,”
under which each party is obligated to terms it manifested and can retract only
with some liability. In contrast to the all-or-nothing nature of the mutual assent
regime, where preliminary forms of consent are either full-blown contracts or create
no obligation, under the no-retraction regime, obligations emerge gradually, as the
positions of the negotiating parties draw closer. Further, the no-retraction liability
regime can be coupled with different damage measures to advance various social
goals, including optimal reliance. The theory is applied to areas of contract formation that have produced inconsistent jurisprudence, such as precontractual liability and misunderstandings, and resolves them in a simple and unified fashion. Finally, the analysis provides a fresh understanding of the obligation to
negotiate in good faith and explores a new criterion for gap-filling in incomplete
contracts.

INTRODUCTION
One of the pillars of the law of contract formation is the principle
of mutual assent. According to this principle, a contract forms only
when the positions of the two parties meet. When the parties represent
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different conceptions of the terms under which they intend to deal,
no contractual liability arises, and both are free to walk away.
Mutual assent has many implications for contract law theory and
doctrine. Importantly, it sets the boundary between the precontractual and the contractual stages. Prior to attaining a consensus, while
an agreement is still being negotiated, no liability arises between the
parties. At some point in time, the positions of the parties (or, more
correctly, their outward manifestations) meet, and full expectation liability emerges. Liability, in other words, does not accumulate continuously. Rather, it rises abruptly as soon as the “qualitative” assent
test is satisfied.
This principle also implies that a contract cannot exist when the
parties remain silent over some important elements of the deal. True,
statutory and judicial gap-fillers have eroded this traditional common
law approach. Nevertheless, in important areas of the transaction, an
absence of affirmative assent to terms still implies a non-contract.
Many of the rules characterizing the legal consequences of the
communications at the contract formation stage are also corollaries of
the mutual assent principle. For example, a communication is an offer—such that it can be accepted unilaterally—only if it is definite; a
response to an offer that does not manifest assent—that changes some
of the terms—is deemed a rejection and terminates the power of the
offeree to unilaterally conclude a deal; and an offer is revocable at any
time prior to its affirmative acceptance.
This Essay suggests that the consensus principle embodied in the
mutual assent doctrine might not be a desirable instrument to advance the goals of potential transactors. It argues that limiting contractual liability to cases in which a consensus was manifested fails to
reflect the different “tones” of the “understandings” and commitments that parties may express throughout the negotiations. As a result of this failure, the basis for contractual liability, in some situations,
may be too narrow to induce optimal reliance by the parties.
As an alternative to the consensus-or-nothing structure, this Essay
explores a no-retraction principle. The basic insight is the following:
A party who manifests a willingness to enter into a contract at given
terms should not be able to freely retract from her manifestation. The opposing party, even if he did not manifest assent, and unless he rejected
the terms, acquires an option to bind his counterpart to her representation or charge her with some liability in case she retracts.
In contrast to the mutual assent approach, the no-retraction principle developed here suggests that when two parties attach different,
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but equally plausible, meanings to their agreed-upon contractual obligation, the absence of consensus would not negate any liability. Instead, under the no-retraction principle, each party should have a
right to enforce a contractual obligation according to the meaning intended by
the other. Further, even when the parties have not reached a full-blown
agreement or an understanding over terms, as in the case where both
parties make serious, but nonconforming, precontractual representations of the proposed terms, the legal consequence should not be mutual rejection accompanied by the freedom to walk away. Rather, the
representations of the parties give rise to bilateral options: each party
can bind (with the magnitude of liability to be specified below) the
other to the terms that party proposed. If the proposal is incomplete
and gaps need to be filled, they will be filled with terms most favorable
(within reason) to the proposing party. Thus, while a party is unable
to retract, it is only from a deal that includes terms she proposed,
supplemented by terms most favorable to her. I will argue that the enforced-against party has no reasonable grounds to reject a deal containing such terms.
Another way to conceptualize this idea is to view liability as a
process of continuous convergence. Initially, when the consensus is
“thin”—when the two parties differ on many terms of the deal—the
option that each party acquires (to enter a deal that is very different
from what she proposes and very favorable to the other party) is of
minimal burden to the other party. As negotiations move forward and
consensus grows, the option that each party acquires becomes more
valuable. It is an option to enforce a deal that includes all the terms
agreed upon, supplemented with the terms proposed by the other
party. Finally, when the two parties reach a full agreement, i.e., mutual assent, the value of this option is identical to the value of the contract. Thus, in effect, the greater the “fraction” of a contract the parties have, the greater the “fraction” of contract liability the plaintiff
can enforce.
The no-retraction principle provides a new underpinning for Lon
1
Fuller’s famous notion of “an ascending scale of enforceability.”

1

Letter from Lon L. Fuller to Karl N. Llewellyn, Professor of Law, Columbia University (Dec. 8, 1938), excerpted in ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 41 (4th ed.
2001). This idea was introduced in L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 2), 46 YALE L.J. 373, 420 (1937) (objecting to the “all-ornothing attitude” of contract law and urging for a more balanced legal approach that
recognizes varying degrees of enforceability).
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Fuller argued that weaker measures of damages—restitution and reliance damages—should be available when the grounds for enforcement are weaker. Liability for retraction satisfies Fuller’s ascending
scale notion, since it correlates the magnitude of liability with the degree of consensus. It differs, however, in important ways from Fuller’s
scale, which was limited to three discrete steps of damages and which
lacked a criterion for when “enforceability” should be weaker. Liability under the no-retraction regime is continuous, with the continuity
achieved not by switching among damage measures, but by affecting
the terms of the deal that the plaintiff can enforce. It provides an operative measure for scaling enforcement that tracks the degree of consensus: the closer the parties’ positions have come, the more severe
the liability consequence.
The no-retraction principle may seem a strange basis for liability
in a system that is so fundamentally attached to the consensus/
agreement principle. Precisely because it seems sufficiently strange to
contract scholars and practitioners, such an alternative perspective is
not commonly recognized. But the conception of contractual liability
arising from a one-sided promise, rather than a two-sided consensus, is
not so foreign to historians of the common law. Prior to the nineteenth-century emergence of the consensus ad idem theory of contract,
liability was implemented through the action of assumpsit—the wrong
of breaching a promissory obligation created by one party. It is only in
more recent times that contractual liability merged with the notion of
2
consensus.
Further, the divorce of obligation from consensus/unanimity and
its grounding instead on a principle of “rejectability”—on whether it is
3
reasonable to reject a bargain—is a familiar idea in moral philosophy.
It is recognized that the notion of consensus as the moral justification
for obligation is narrower than the notion of what is unreasonable to
4
reject. Accordingly, the no-retraction principle provides a specific

2

See A. W. B. Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 L.Q. REV.
247, 257-58 (1975) (explaining that the notion of consensus was assimilated into the
common law by nineteenth-century treatise writers); see also Philip A. Hamburger, The
Development of the Nineteenth-Century Consensus Theory of Contract, 7 L. & HIST. REV. 241
(1989) (exploring the gradual evolution of consensus notions in common law since
medieval times).
3
See, e.g., T. M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND
BEYOND 103, 110-12 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (describing contractualism as an alternative to utilitarianism that focuses on the reasonableness of rejection, rather than on the reasonableness of acceptance).
4
Id. at 117.
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conception of non-rejectability. It is also consistent with extra-legal
“no-going-back” norms in negotiations, which, for example, informally sanction a party who responds to the other party’s concessions
5
by toughening, rather than softening, her own proposals. In this Essay, I will not explore in any depth these historical, philosophical, or
sociological aspects. They are mentioned here in passing to suggest
that the consensus principle of contract formation—being such a
fundamental part of our modern legal and economic heritage—is not
the only sensible basis for liability and to propose that an alternative
6
no-retraction basis is at least possible.
In fact, if one looks carefully enough, it is easy to find numerous
instances within existing doctrine in which contractual liability is
founded not on consent, but on a variant of the no-retraction approach. For example, there are circumstances in which offerors cannot retract their offers either because they chose to make “firm offers”
or because the law imposes an irrevocability principle. Here, offerors
are legally bound even before acceptance.7 Similarly, where the
agreement leaves a term to be further negotiated, courts might forbid
a party to reject a proposal made by the other party that is very favor8
able to the rejecting party. In rationalizing these and related “intermediate liability” doctrines, the courts explicitly invoked the justifications underlying the no-retraction principle. Accordingly, the noretraction regime can be viewed not as a doctrinal innovation, but
rather, as a unifying principle. Recognizing such a principle would
accord greater consistency in the application of existing precontractual

5

See , e . g . , FRED CHARLES IKLÉ, HOW NATIONS NEGOTIATE 22-23 (1976) (observing that in international negotiations, it is “improper . . . to revert to a harder position
from a more conciliatory one”).
6
This exploration of an alternative basis for liability is different than the exploration initiated by scholars like Professor P. S. Atiyah, who examine the case for reliancebased liability. See P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1-7
(1979) (introducing the argument in favor of reliance-based liability). The approach
developed in this Essay is different in that it maintains the promise, rather than harm or
benefit, as the basis of liability, but does not require consent.
7
See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 759-60 (Cal. 1958) (stating
that a subcontractor could not revoke its bid even prior to acceptance by the general
contractor, if the general contractor relied upon that bid).
8
See 1 J.M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.3, at 577-79 (rev. ed. 1993) (surveying cases in which indefiniteness was cured by terms that are maximally favorable to
the defendant (the retracting party)); Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling
Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at
33-40, on file with author) (outlining several existing doctrines that fill contractual
gaps with terms most favorable to the defendant).
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liability doctrines and may resolve many other problematic features of
the mutual assent doctrine.
To illustrate a doctrinal implication of the proposed approach,
consider the situation of a misunderstanding, often regarded as the
pedagogical benchmark of the consensus principle. Under the doctrine of mutual assent, where the two parties assign different, but
equally plausible, meanings to a basic provision of the contract, and
where neither party has reason to know of the other’s intent, no meet9
ing of the minds—and thus no contractual liability—can be found.
Where, for instance, the buyer of a cotton shipload intended it to arrive on a ship named Peerless that sails in October, and the seller intended it to arrive on a different Peerless ship that sails in December,
10
no contract had been formed between the parties. Under the noretraction approach, in contrast, each party would have the option of
enforcing the contract, albeit in line with the meaning intended by
the other party. For example, if market conditions changed after an
agreement was reached and one of the parties attempted to retract
opportunistically, the retracting party could be forced to perform the
deal as she intended it.
Another important situation in which the no-retraction regime
applies is that of preliminary agreements. Currently, drawing the line
between precontractual understandings that are not enforceable and
contractual agreements that are implicates one of the most confusing
doctrines in contract law. While this line is important to draw—it is
the difference between “all” or “nothing” liability—in practice, it is
also very difficult to draw in a consistent manner, leading to a confus11
ing and unpredictable jurisprudence. Under the no-retraction approach, no line needs to be drawn. When parties reach an agreement
in principle over some fundamental terms but plan to further negotiate, each party acquires the option to bind the other to a deal that includes the terms agreed upon, supplemented by proposals made by
the other party and terms most favorable to that party. In other
words, each party can enforce a full agreement that is at least as

9

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(1) (1981).
Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375, 375 (Ex. 1864).
11
See E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 259-60 (1987) (“It would be difficult to find a less predictable area of contract law.”); K. N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law
of Contract: Offer and Acceptance (pt. 1), 48 YALE L.J. 1, 13-14 (1938) (lamenting that
rules governing preliminary agreements “are utterly devoid of . . . meaning” when applied to the facts).
10
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profitable to the other party as it had plausibly hoped for when entering the preliminary agreement.
Part II of this Essay will explore these and additional implications of the no-retraction principle. It will offer a fresh look at the
requirement of “definiteness” and examine the implications of the
no-retraction regime for the doctrines of offer and acceptance and for
the duty to negotiate in good faith. This inquiry will also yield an alternative approach to gap-filling in incomplete contracts, a potential
contribution to the theory of default rules.
Before proceeding, however, it is worth emphasizing what this Essay is not about. It is not about the debate between objective and subjective theories of assent. The no-retraction idea is a substitute for the
mutual assent approach, whether taken as an objective idea (convergence of “manifestations”) or as a subjective principle (meeting of the
minds). The no-retraction principle replaces the element of consensus, the notion that the “positions” of the parties ought to meet. It can
therefore be equally relevant to either the objective or subjective approaches, as both embody this notion. Further, this Essay is not about
contract law being subsumed by tort principles. True, no-retraction
liability can resemble tort liability; it results from a unilateral action
not much different than, say, liability for misrepresentation. However,
it is nonetheless the will of a party—a “promise”—that ignites liability.
The obligation is voluntary and promise-based, yet decoupled: A contract can be two, potentially different, bargains, with each party “responsible” for one.
Some of the ideas developed in this Essay have been studied previously. For example, the concept of attaching liability to relied-upon
precontractual representations was carefully developed in recent lit12
erature and has appeared in earlier legal writings on the precontrac13
tual duty of good faith. In addition, as mentioned above, the idea of

12

See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 423, 431-43 (2001) (analyzing how alternative liability schemes promote
optimal levels of precontractual reliance); Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 507-43 (1996) (exploring efficient reliance as an
implicit economic rationale underlying courts’ decisions in contract formation cases);
Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary
Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1270-77 (1996) (examining the effects of promissory
estoppel on the incentives of negotiating parties).
13
See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV.
673, 684-86 (1969) (arguing that a party to a negotiation should be held liable for
withdrawing from a partial agreement when the negotiations have given rise to a mutual commitment to bargain in good faith to complete a contract).
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a “sliding scale of enforceability” originates from Fuller. This Essay
builds on those earlier ideas to develop a general view, uniform across
various areas of contracting, of the gradual ascent of liability—of “contracts without consent.” And while many of the doctrinal implications
of the no-retraction principle have also been explored previously,
these applications have not been viewed before through the general
lens developed in this Essay, as representing this “contracts without
consent” pattern.
The analysis is divided into two Parts: Part I examines the abstract
properties of a principle of no-retraction; Part II applies that principle
and briefly explores some doctrinal implications of a no-retraction
regime.
I. THE NO -RETRACTION PRINCIPLE: THEORY
A. The All-or-Nothing Nature of Contractual Liability
One of the most fundamental features of contractual liability is its
emergence in an all-or-nothing fashion. This legal dichotomy is striking because the positions of the parties, who contemplate a deal and
negotiate its terms at arms length, converge in a gradual, rather than
abrupt, fashion. The process of overcoming differences in initial bargaining positions and eventually achieving consensus is normally a
continuous one. During the course of dealmaking, different components of an agreement are typically negotiated sequentially and resolved in piecemeal fashion. Nevertheless, while the parties’ manifested will to be bound exhibits this gradual ascent, the legal consequences attached to it have a discontinuous structure.
Initially, when the parties’ positions are far apart and their will to
be bound is weak, there are no legal consequences arising from the
negotiations. As the positions of the parties grow somewhat closer
and their will to be bound increases, the legal consequences remain
null. Eventually, however, there comes a point in the negotiation
process at which the positions of the parties are sufficiently close—
when their will to be bound is sufficiently strong—that the legal consequences shift abruptly to full contractual (that is, expectation) liability. While the difference in the legal consequences is qualitative—no
liability versus full liability—the threshold at which the consequences
change is not always qualitatively distinguishable. The difficulty lies in
the fact that the doctrine of mutual assent only measures whether sufficient proximity between the parties’ positions has been achieved. It
is possible that the threshold of mutual assent may be crossed even
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though some issues are left up in the air, so long as the accumulation
of the agreed-upon issues is sufficient to set off a presumption of full
agreement.
Due to the vagueness of this threshold, courts have been inconsistent in their attempts to draw the line between the no-liability precon14
tractual stage and the full-liability contract. Cases with similar facts,
in which the degree of the understanding between the parties was
comparable, have been decided differently. Opportunistic retractions
from relied-upon understandings have at times been permitted,
whereas harmless retractions that occurred immediately after “hand15
shake deals” sometimes have led to heavy damages. This unpredictability of the law also has adverse ex ante effects. First, parties might
need to specify explicitly the legal consequences to be attached to
each negotiation stage, thus increasing transaction costs. Second, and
more importantly, the unpredictable dichotomous legal regime makes
it more difficult for the parties to ascertain the degree of confidence
with which they should go ahead and rely on representations made by
their negotiating or contracting partners.
Nevertheless, all-or-nothing mechanisms are often hailed for the
certainty that they provide. This line of reasoning argues that if liability arises only after a qualitative test is satisfied in full, the parties will
be able to recognize the incidence of liability with greater precision.
But while the advantage of certainty is surely associated with specific
consent rituals, such as the handshake, the wedding ceremony, or the
notary seal, it is hardly apparent in instances where the qualitative
test is substantive in nature, lacking any ritual. In contract law, the
14

Commentators have complained about the resulting inconsistency of case outcomes. See Gerald B. Buechler, Jr., The Recognition of Preliminary Agreements in Negotiated
Corporate Acquisitions: An Empirical Analysis of the Disagreement Process, 22 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 573, 574 (1989) (“[T]he decisions in this area . . . continue to appear both confusing and inconsistent to the point where it is said to be virtually impossible to predict
the outcome in a particular case.”); Harvey L. Temkin, When Does the “Fat Lady” Sing?:
An Analysis of “Agreements in Principle” in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 125,
130 & n.23 (1986) (noting how decisions in this area have been inconsistent and how
this lack of clearly defined rules has led to uncertainty among negotiators); sources
cited supra note 11 (summarizing this area of the law as confusing and unpredictable).
15
Compare Cont’l Labs., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 759 F. Supp. 538, 539, 542 (S.D.
Iowa 1990) (finding no liability where parties reached an oral agreement that resolved,
after many rounds of negotiations, most principal issues and where retraction occurred
after one party announced that it “was no longer interested in the venture”), with Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 859-66 (Tex. App. 1987) (holding a party
liable for lost profits and punitive damages notwithstanding the fact that the parties’
agreement in principle had resulted from only a brief round of negotiations and the
defendant’s retraction occurred almost immediately thereafter).
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qualitative test of consent—being a standard, not a bright-line rule—
does not increase certainty, as it may be satisfied independently of any
evident ritual.
B. The No-Retraction Principle
Under the no-retraction regime, a party who manifests a willingness to enter into a contract with some given terms should not be able
to retract freely from her representation. The opposing party, even
prior to expressing assent, and unless he affirmatively rejected the
terms, acquires an option to bind his counterpart to her representation, and a violation of this option would lead to some liability. Thus,
the triggering event that creates liability is not the convergence of two
wills, as is the case under standard assent doctrine, but rather, the
manifestation of only one will. Once an individual manifests her intent to deal under some terms, she makes a unilateral commitment
not to retract from a deal conforming to these terms.
This principle can apply at different stages of the interaction. At
an advanced stage of the transaction, when a full-blown agreement is
reached but the parties dispute its proper interpretation, neither party
can retract from her own intended interpretation; namely, each may
be bound to their own interpretation if the other party so chooses.
Earlier in the negotiations process, when an understanding emerges
over some components of the transaction, neither party can retract
16
from the terms of the preliminary understanding. Finally, even at
early stages of the negotiations, as soon as a party manifests an intent
to be bound to some terms, she (alone) cannot freely retract from
these terms.

16

A similar approach to precontractual understandings is suggested by Allan
Farnsworth. See Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 280-81 (explaining that reneging on
terms is unfair dealing and should constitute a breach of the duty to bargain in good
faith). Variants of this approach were applied in several famous cases. See Itek Corp. v.
Chi. Aerial Indus., 248 A.2d 625, 629 (Del. 1968) (stating that an informal letter of intent to merge obligated parties to make a good faith attempt to reach a formal contract of merger); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn.
1981) (finding liability where the defendant health clinic revoked its offer of at-will
employment only after plaintiff quit his job and declined other employment in reliance on the clinic’s offer); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis.
1965) (imposing damages for breach of a promise that never materialized into a contract, based on a reliance/promissory estoppel theory).
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1. A Comparison of the No-Retraction and
the Mutual Assent Principles
More methodically, the no-retraction approach differs from standard assent doctrine in several fundamental respects:
a. No Consensus
A party can be bound in the absence of a consensus over terms. A
party is bound to the terms she represented, irrespective of whether
the other party represented identical terms or any terms at all. Liability under this approach, like tort liability, results from a unilateral
wrongful action of a party—in this case, retraction from a representation.
Put differently, the no-retraction principle “decouples” the legal
conception of intent-to-be-bound. Under standard doctrine, either
both parties have an intent to be bound, or neither has, as the intent
to be bound is inferred from the fit between the parties’ positions,
namely, the “thickness” of the consensus. Therefore, the fewer terms
included in the understanding, the less likely courts are to recognize
17
the existence of an intent to be bound. Under the no-retraction approach, in contrast, each party’s intent can be inferred separately, and
each may intend to be bound to a separate set of terms that favors
herself. Consensus is the point at which the “two intents” converge,
but the intents may exist prior to, and independently of, convergence.
Under this approach, it is not consensus that creates liability, but
rather, each individual’s separate manifestation of intent (and, indeed, it is possible for only one party to be bound). It should be
noted that this is not a dramatic departure from existing grounds of
obligation. For example, when courts supplement contracts with
standard gap-fillers, these additional terms are binding, not because
the parties consented to them (they never did), but because they pro18
vide a rational basis for contractual obligation. It is this same rational basis that is invoked by the no-retraction approach, applied to
each party separately. It might be rational for each party to accept a
different set of terms, and it is these terms that the law would prohibit
her from rejecting.
17

U.C.C. § 2-204 official cmt. (2003) (“The more terms the parties leave open, the
less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a binding agreement . . . .”).
18
See Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and
Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 707-09 (1989) (grounding default rule theories on rationality, rather than on the consent fiction).
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b. Asymmetry
A prominent feature of assent-based liability is the fact that the
terms each party can enforce are identical. If, say, a contractual term
(or a gap-filler) specified a price, p, both parties can enforce only that
price. Under the no-retraction principle, in contrast, each party
might have the option to enforce a different set of terms. If the seller
proposed a price, pS , and the buyer proposed a price, pB (with pS > pB ),
each party may enforce a transaction with a different price: the buyer
may enforce a deal that includes the seller’s proposed price, pS , and
vice versa. Thus, this regime has a built-in asymmetry. Each party can
be forced to transact under one set of terms (her own proposal) but,
at the same time, can force the other to transact under another set of
19
terms (the opponent’s proposal). This asymmetry is consistent with
the notion that each individual, having proposed a different bargain,
should be confronted with a different restriction on what she may reasonably reject. Specifically, while each individual may reject the terms
that the other proposed, there is less of a reason to allow each indi20
vidual to reject the terms that she herself represented as acceptable.
c. Biased Supplementation of Missing Terms
When a party makes an incomplete representation, in the sense
that it is silent about some elements of the deal, and if the other party
acquires an option, the option must specify how these missing elements should be supplemented. The standard gap-filling approach
in contract enforcement utilizes “reasonable” or “majoritarian”
21
22
terms; more sophisticated approaches utilize contra proferentem or

19

Note that the asymmetry is only with respect to the content of the gap-fillers. In
other respects, the parties are in symmetric relations because both hold, and both are
subject to, an option to deal.
20
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to inquire into the philosophical underpinnings of the non-rejectability of an individual’s own representations. For a discussion
of the “will theory” origins of the binding force of promises, see JAMES GORDLEY, THE
PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 161-237 (1991). More
generally, for the moral basis of this principle of obligation, see Scanlon, supra note 3.
21
See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 3.28, at 211-12 (3d ed. 1999)
(noting examples of courts inserting reasonable terms for price and time of performance).
22
See 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 24.27, at 282-83 ( Joseph
M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1998) (interpreting ambiguous contract terms to “adopt the
meaning that is less favorable in its legal effect to the party who chose the words”).
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“information-forcing” defaults.23 In principle, similar gap-filling techniques could apply under the no-retraction regime; however, this
would pose several problems. First, it is not unreasonable to reject
majoritarian terms, even if they are reasonable. That is, there may be
a “region” of reasonable terms such that a party’s insistence on terms
that are in the favorable end of this region and her refusal to be obligated to the midrange or average term is not unreasonable. Second,
with standard gap-fillers, the emergence of liability would cease to be
gradual. Liability resulting from a preliminary understanding will by
and large resemble the liability under a fully specified agreement.
With standard gap-fillers, the set of terms in both instances will, on
average, be the same. The burden of the no-retraction regime under
the standard gap-filling approach will be high: As soon as a party
makes a preliminary representation, it can be bound to the “average”
contract.
Accordingly, the no-retraction regime would be appealing if the
missing terms were supplemented by terms most favorable (within the
set of reasonable terms) to the enforced-against party. We can think
24
of such gap-fillers as “pro-defendant.” This “biased” supplementation in favor of the defendant satisfies two objectives. First, as will be
shown, it has sufficient “teeth” to protect the other party against opportunistic retractions, and thus, it provides optimal reliance incentives. Second, it effectively guarantees that the final agreement to be
enforced is no worse than what the party who made the proposal or
entered the partial understanding could have intended. This is the
only agreement of which it can confidently be said that this party
manifested her “constructive” intent to be bound. She may have
pragmatically hoped for something less favorable, but in the absence
of an affirmative statement, the only terms that we can safely impose
on her without bending her will are her most favorable terms. These
25
are terms that she has no reasonable or rational grounds to reject.
As courts intuitively recognize, if one party concedes the terms
that are most favorable to the other party in order to overcome the
23

See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91-118 (1989) (identifying situations in
which efficiency-minded courts should fill gaps in a way that is clearly unfavorable to
one or both of the parties).
24
Another way to conceptualize this gap-filling approach is pro-proferentem (“in favor of the drafter” of the proposal), as distinguished from the contra proferentem doctrine (“against the drafter”).
25
See Coleman et al., supra note 18, at 648-49 (asserting that the absence of a consent-based justification does not diminish the rationality-based justification).
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indefiniteness of an agreement, “there is no longer any way the provi26
sion[s] may be construed to [the other party’s] detriment.” Consequently, resisting the enforcement of such an agreement is unreasonable, being inconsistent with the party’s prior representations.
d. Opting Out of the No-Retraction Regime
The no-retraction regime attaches more costly consequences to
early communications between the parties. In a sense, the “freedom
from contract” is weakened. As a result, parties that place great value
on this freedom can choose to opt out of the liability consequences
and opt into the consensus regime. The no-retraction regime is
merely a default: Techniques like revocable offers, non-binding proposals, and letters of intent, which are already common in light of existing forms of precontractual liability, could be used to reserve the
right of free retraction.
2. Implications of the Key Features of a No-Retraction Approach
Several implications of the above properties should be noted.
First, while contractual liability under the mutual assent framework is
created abruptly, liability under the no-retraction principle accumulates in a continuous fashion. This liability is still triggered by a discrete event: a serious unilateral representation of terms by a party.
However, in terms of relations between the representations of the two
parties, the effective burden of this type of liability increases gradually.
Initially, before much consensus is achieved, the option granted to the
opposing party imposes only a small burden on the proposer. As the
negotiation moves along and the proposals made by each party become less one-sided—and thus begin to represent an emerging compromise—the burden of the no-retraction principle grows. That is,
the value of the option granted to the opposing party increases.
When the proposals made by the parties converge, the burden they
impose equals familiar contractual liability. At this stage, the grounds
27
for liability can shift from no-retraction to consent.
A second, related implication is that parties would have the ability
to create obligations that will eventually depend on the identity of the
26

Busching v. Griffin, 542 So. 2d 860, 864 (Miss. 1989).
The idea that the basis for liability can shift over time, as the parties introduce
new elements into their relationship, is a central theme in Atiyah’s view of contractual
liability. See ATIYAH, supra note 6, at 3-4 (describing the process by which “the ground
for imposing [] liability shifts”).
27

2004]

CONTRACTS WITHOUT CONSENT

1843

party seeking enforcement. When parties are unable to agree on how
to resolve some issues, they will often leave the terms open or ambiguous in order to avoid a negotiation breakdown. Under standard
28
contract law, this practice might render the contract unenforceable.
The no-retraction principle’s use of decoupled supplementation provides a different solution to this problem. Where the missing provisions’ content depends on the identity of the party against whom enforcement is sought, the law would guarantee that the issues at
stalemate will not provide any basis for unilateral retraction from the
rest of the deal.
A further implication worth noting involves certain polar situations. At one extreme, the parties’ proposals completely overlap. In
this case of consensus, the no-retraction approach does not change
any of the familiar legal consequences associated with assent-based
contractual liability: Both parties are obligated to an identical set of
terms. At the other extreme, the parties have made no proposals at
all, never having entered into negotiations. The logic underlying the
no-retraction approach, which dictates that missing terms in the proposal be supplemented by the terms most favorable to the party
against whom enforcement is sought, can be stretched to provide a
basis for obligation even in the absence of proposals, and even prior
to any negotiations. Each party can be given an option to force a
transaction on the counterparty based on the terms offered by that
counterparty (of which there are none) and supplemented by terms
most favorable to the counterparty (constituting the entire deal).
This polar case represents a transformation of all property rules into
liability rules: Endowments can now be taken non-consensually, albeit
priced in a way so favorable to the endowment holder that it eliminates, at least from the holder’s economic perspective, any cost of
such a move.
This last observation explains why liability for retraction ought to
be restricted to proposals that are sufficiently rich in detail, or serious.
This familiar constraint is regularly applied under the mutual assent
regime, whereby contracts are supplemented by gap-fillers only to
the extent that the terms over which there is consensus provide a
sufficient basis to infer intent to be bound. Likewise, under the
no-retraction regime, a party will be bound to her unilateral representation—which can also be supplemented by her most favorable

28

1 PERILLO, supra note 8, § 2.8, at 134 (“[A] ‘contract to make a contract’ is not a
contract at all.”).
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terms—if the representation provides enough detail to infer that
party’s intent to contract under its terms. The mutual assent regime
restrains its supplementation methodology in order to protect the
voluntary nature of contracts and to preserve the domain of property
rules; the same restraint can be employed by the no-retraction regime.
Recall: the no-retraction principle is a substitute only to the consensus element of the mutual assent regime. Otherwise, it incorporates all the remaining “checks and balances.”
C. The Measure of Damages
The no-retraction principle is a basis for liability, not a damage
measure. It replaces the consensus principle as a basis for contractual
liability, and consequently, it determines when liability arises, but not
its magnitude. The principle of no-retraction can therefore be coupled with various measures of damages, depending on the underlying
objective that the remedy seeks to promote. The magnitude of optimal damages, then, would depend on context and the underlying social objective.
There are various social objectives that can justify different measures of damages. Take, for example, the economic perspective. One
goal of damages is the prevention of opportunistic breach and the
promotion of efficient investment in the relationship. This goal is
29
generally consistent with the expectation measure of damages. Accordingly, the no-retraction liability will be coupled with expectation
damages in circumstances in which expectation damages are desirable. If a party has already performed a contract and seeks to enforce
it upon a retracting, opportunistic opponent, expectation damages
would apply.
It is important to note that whenever the no-retraction principle
provides a basis for liability that would otherwise not exist under
the mutual assent principle, this basis for liability does affect the quantity of expectation damages. The plaintiff can only enforce the terms
as intended by the defendant. The expectation remedy is thus calculated according to the value of the deal to the enforcing party, using
the terms offered by the retracting party (which, recall, are supplemented in a manner most favorable to the retracting party). As a result, this is a less generous measure of damages than the standard one
29

See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 190 (3d ed. 2000)
(illustrating how “perfect expectation damages create incentives for efficient performance and breach” and “elicit efficient commitment from the promissor to perform”).
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applied in contractual breach. Likewise, with respect to specific performance, the plaintiff can only enforce the deal intended by the de30
fendant.
There are, however, other contexts in which economic goals would
be promoted if the no-retraction liability were coupled with the more
modest reliance measure of damages. For example, in situations in
which parties have not completed the negotiations but merely have
reached some preliminary understandings, the social goal is to induce
them to make efficient reliance and choice-of-partner decisions in
light of the potential for holdup. In such cases, the optimal remedy
for retracting from the understandings and the proposal would be re31
liance damages.
In general, any applicable damage measure under the standard
mutual assent basis for liability could apply under the no-retraction
basis for liability as well. The no-retraction principle provides an alternative occasion for the apportionment of these damages, not an alternative measure. Thus, all the familiar standards for quantifying a
measure of damages, such as foreseeability and certainty, continue to
apply to damages under the no-retraction approach.
D. Implementation
The no-retraction regime supplements deals with terms most favorable to the retracting party. Unlike majoritarian terms, which can
be constructed based on evidence regarding market practices, “most
favorable” terms require courts to be able to generate two sets of provisions, depending on the party seeking enforcement. Is the task of
identifying such terms too burdensome for courts to accomplish?
It is important to recall that difficulties in application were a
perceived feature of another “intermediate” precontractual liability
standard, namely, the duty to negotiate in good faith. Indeed, one
critic labeled good faith as “an amorphous concept, manifested in
endlessly variable settings and forms, . . . [that] does not identify a

30

For example, in Ontario Downs, Inc. v. Lauppe, 13 Cal. Rptr. 782 (Ct. App. 1961),
the parties agreed in principle over the sale of 16 acres of land for $50,000, but intended to negotiate where, within the seller’s 450-acre lot, the 16-acre tract lay. Id. at
784. The court determined that if the buyer had no contractual right to select the
tract location, it could only enforce a deal that included a tract designated by the
seller. Id. at 787.
31
This argument is developed rigorously in Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note
12, and it is illustrated with simple numerical examples in Part I.E, infra.
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32

manageable body of law for analytic inquiry.” Despite these difficulties, the good faith duty is now an integral part of most legal systems,
and implementation problems are no longer perceived as reasons to
33
abolish it. It is also important to recall that other doctrines of gapfilling instruct courts to pick out one-sided terms. The doctrine of
contra proferentem, for example, designates gap-fillers that are least fa34
vorable to the drafter of the contract. More generally, penalty default rules also require courts to utilize one-sided, non-market terms.
Having to supplement deals with terms most favorable to the retracting party does not necessarily imply that courts would bear a
more burdensome judicial task. In most situations, courts would only
have to know the range of reasonable terms and then determine
whether the retracting party insisted on terms outside this range. In a
precontractual setting, when a party retracts from an understanding
by refusing to accept a proposal to settle the remaining issues, the
court would have to determine if terms exist that are reasonable, but
more favorable, to the retracting party than those proposed.
Further, there are compelling reasons to believe that the task of
filling gaps with terms most favorable to the defendant is within the
courts’ institutional capability. First, in adversarial proceedings, this
type of one-sided evidence is precisely what each party presents to the
court. Even in the current system, where courts look for majoritarian
terms, parties provide self-serving evidence concerning disputed elements. This evidence is treated with justified suspicion by courts that
are seeking midrange gap-fillers, but in a no-retraction regime, it
would be useful for picking the end-range, or most favorable, gapfillers. For example, in cases involving an agreement to agree over the
price, the court can choose the price as assessed by the defendant’s
35
expert witness. Second, the court can extract the information by

32

Eric M. Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good Faith Disclosure
in Contract Formation, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 381, 382-83 (1978) (footnote omitted); see also
Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619, 642-49
(discussing the problems surrounding the good faith standard within a section entitled
“Administrative Difficulties in Remedying Bad Faith”).
33
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1743, 1807-08 (2000) (maintaining that the difficulty in identifying bad faith
should not be a reason for failing to recognize the general duty).
34
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) (providing for “[i]nterpretation [a]gainst the [d]raftsman”); KNIFFIN, supra note 22, § 24.27 (rev. ed. 1998)
(discussing the contra proferentem doctrine).
35
See, e.g., Lassiter v. Kaufman, 581 So. 2d 147, 148-49 (Fla. 1991) (affirming the
trial court’s decision to pick the price assessed by the defendant landlord’s expert
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instructing the defendant to designate the missing terms, with the
threat that, if the defendant fails to do so reasonably, the court will
36
pick its own term.
It should be noted that the principle of no-retraction could be
translated into legal commands either by rules or by standards. Nothing in the shift from a consent regime to a no-retraction regime affects the level of precision or generalization of the liability norm. The
mutual assent approach is sometimes implemented by rules (e.g., offer and acceptance) and other times by standards (e.g., majoritarian
gap-fillers). Similarly, no-retraction can be a basis for rules (e.g., offer-irrevocability) or for standards (e.g., pro-defendant gap-filling).
In the end, however, it might well be that a mutual assent regime
with majoritarian defaults is cheaper to administer than a noretraction regime with pro-defendant gap-fillers. In this case, one
contribution of the present analysis is in fleshing out an additional
reason for the prevalence of the mutual assent regime. This regime
has maintained an intuitive appeal, not because it is the natural way
for contractual obligations to arise, but rather because it is the easier
way for contractual obligations to be enforced.
E. The Efficiency of the No-Retraction Regime
The no-retraction regime was presented above as a conceptual advance, as a “natural” legal platform for tracking the progress of negotiations. It provides a more flexible set of tools for transforming the
understandings between parties into legal obligations. This Section
attempts to rationalize the no-retraction regime on the basis of instrumental, rather than conceptual, grounds. It demonstrates that the
no-retraction regime proves superior in settings in which the social
goal is to encourage precontractual reliance. In addition, it addresses
the concern that a no-retraction regime would chill the incentives of
parties to make proposals and distort their decisions to enter and exit
negotiations.

witness in a contract that featured an option to renew under a price to be agreed upon
by the parties).
36
This technique was used in Ontario Downs, Inc. v. Lauppe, 13 Cal. Rptr. 782 (Ct.
App. 1961). In that case, the court allowed the defendants to choose a parcel of land
to give to the plaintiff in fulfillment of a contract, with the threat that failure to select a
reasonable parcel would result in the court allowing the plaintiff to choose. Id. at 787.
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1. The Holdup Problem
Anytime before or after the agreement, a party can make reliance
investments—expenditures that raise the value of the completed
transaction, but that have no value otherwise. It has long been recognized that such investments are subject to a distortive holdup prob37
lem.
When the party who incurs the cost of the investment
appropriates its full benefit, the incentives to invest are optimal. Underinvestment occurs when the investing party bears the entire cost of
the investment but enjoys only a fraction of its benefit.
Consider, specifically, an investment that is made after some initial proposals or understandings have been discussed, but before the
parties have bound themselves to a particular division of the “pie.”
Take, for example, the case where two merging firms have reached
some understanding over the terms of the merger, but have not finalized the agreement. At this stage, one of the firms can make a relationship-specific investment, which would increase the value of the
merger should it be finalized. The social goal at this stage is to induce
38
optimal, surplus-maximizing investment.
2. Comparison of the Liability Regimes
Let us compare two liability regimes. The first—the standard mutual assent rule—imposes no liability on the parties prior to their
reaching a full-blown consensus. If, following the investment, the
other party insists on terms that are more aggressive than the ones
discussed preliminarily and an agreement fails, no liability arises. The
second—the no-retraction principle—imposes reliance liability on the
other party if he retracts from the preliminary understanding.
Each liability regime creates different incentives for the parties involved in this merger example. Under the mutual assent regime,
there is no contract yet, and both parties are free to bargain for their

37

The holdup problem arises when parties cannot contract over reliance expenditures due to high transaction costs, non-verifiability of the investment, and strategic
considerations. See Katz, supra note 12, at 1278 (describing the holdup problem in
relation to precontractual reliance investments). See generally Alan Schwartz, Incomplete
Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 277, 27879 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
38
While this goal is strictly efficiency-oriented, it does not conflict with any fairness- or distribution-oriented goals. Since the maximization discussed here is precontractual, the subsequent contract will divide the surplus between the parties according
to factors independent of the maximization itself (e.g., the bargaining power of the
parties, legal constraints, etc.).
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share of the surplus that was added by the investment. In particular,
they can ignore the pre-investment representation of terms, as it does
not lead to any liability. Their final agreement may deviate from the
initial terms and will instead divide the new post-investment surplus.
Because the cost of the investment will already be sunk, it will not be
factored into the subsequent bargaining. Thus, the investing party
can only capture a fraction of the ex post surplus, but since she bears
39
its entire cost, her incentives to invest will be suboptimal.
Under the no-retraction regime, in contrast, the opposing party is
limited in its ability to ignore previous understandings and proposals
it made and to extract a portion of the increased surplus. Such bargaining strategies amount to a retraction, and if they are sufficiently
aggressive, they will lead to negotiation breakdown coupled with, at
the very least, an imposition of reliance liability on the retracting
party. This power to impose liability protects the investing party from
feeling pressured to acquiesce to new, adverse terms. While renegotiation might still occur, the retracting party must restrain its position
to avoid negotiation breakdown. A retracting party cannot make a
claim to a division of the pie that leaves the investing party with a
negative payoff, given her investment. In effect, any additional dollar
the investing party contributes increases the share of the surplus she
subsequently can extract by one dollar, enabling her to enjoy the full
benefit of the investment. Thus, the investing party cannot be held
up by the retracting party, and her incentives to make investments in
40
this interim stage are optimal. Put differently, a full-blown contract

39

The following example illustrates this distortion. Consider a sale transaction
where, prior to any investment by the buyer, the buyer’s valuation is 100 and the
seller’s cost is 0. Assuming equal bargaining power, the parties reach an initial understanding over a price of 50. The buyer can make an investment of 30, increasing her
valuation by 50, to 150. It is efficient to make this investment and increase the net surplus from 100 to 120 (150 – 30 ). Without the investment, the price will remain 50 and
the buyer’s net payoff will be 50 (100 – 50 ). With the investment, when the ex post
surplus will increase to 150, the buyer expects that the seller will retract from the initial
understanding and that the subsequent agreement will set a price of 75 (midrange of 0
and 150). This will leave the buyer with a net payoff of 45 (150 – 75 – 30 ), lower than
the payoff without the investment. Thus, the efficient investment will not be made.
40
To see how the rule against retraction resolves the holdup distortion, consider
again the above numerical example. Supra note 39. In the bargaining round that follows the buyer’s investment, although the buyer’s valuation increased to 150, the seller
cannot insist on a price greater than 120. A higher price will leave the buyer, who invested 30, with a negative net payoff; the buyer will prefer to reject it and impose retraction liability on the seller, thus getting her cost reimbursed. Therefore, the subsequent price must lie in the range between 0 and 120 and—assuming equal bargaining
power—will equal 60. The buyer’s net payoff will be 60 (150 – 60 – 30 ), greater than
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is unnecessary to protect precontractual reliance; the milder no41
retraction liability, coupled with reliance damages, will suffice.
3. Incentives to Enter Negotiations
The no-retraction principle reduces the parties’ freedom from
contract. In contrast to the all-or-nothing regime, under which a significant portion of the negotiation is conducted without any liability
consequences, the no-retraction principle makes it costly for the parties to cease negotiations. This early liability consequence, it might be
argued, would discourage parties from entering negotiations, making
42
proposals, and reaching precontractual understandings.
In situations where parties enter negotiations for reasons other
than to transact, this conjectured chilling effect is surely valid, but it
may also be quite desirable. If, for example, a party is entering negotiations with an innocent opponent only to extract information from
that opponent or to assert pressure on a third party, the negotiations
have no social value, and reducing their incidence by attaching liabil43
ity to retraction is a valuable effect. Even if the motivation of the
party in entering negotiations is more innocent, forcing her to bear

the non-investment payoff of 50, and thus, the buyer will elect to invest. Note that a
retraction does occur, but it is mild enough so that an agreement can still be completed.
41
This regime, although utilizing reliance damages, does not lead to the familiar
overreliance problem, as identified by Steven Shavell and others. See , e.g., Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 479-80 (1980) (explaining how reliance damages can lead to excessive investment). The reason, in a
nutshell, is that under no-retraction liability, the reliance investment is not guaranteed
to yield returns; there is still the risk that a contract will not be formed and that the
investor will have to bear her costs.
42
See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.26, at 361 (2d
ed. 1998) (describing a “chilling effect” of discouraging parties from entering negotiations); Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the
Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 416-17, 445-46 (1999) (arguing that liability for pre-trade representations in the event of negotiation breakdown would cause
“the market to shrink” and would force parties to use more cautious bargaining strategies, thereby wasting opportunities for efficient trade); Wouter P.J. Wils, Who Should
Bear the Costs of Failed Negotiations? A Functional Inquiry into Pre-Contractual Liability, 4 J.
ECONOMISTES & ETUDES HUMAINES 93, 103 (1992) (claiming that precontractual liability “tends to lower inefficiently the incentives of parties to enter contract negotiations
at the outset”).
43
Indeed, under doctrines such as good faith bargaining and misrepresentation,
courts have limited the freedom of parties to strategically enter (and exit) negotiations. See, e.g., 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 3.26, at 354-55 (describing an example
of intentional misrepresentation in lease negotiations in which a court awarded damages based on the lessee’s reliance losses).
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the cost she inflicted on an opponent would correct the otherwise excessive incidence of failed negotiations.
There are, to be sure, legitimate factors affecting the willingness
of parties to enter negotiations and the freedom they seek to exit negotiations. However, to the extent that parties enter negotiations that
have the potential of increasing overall surplus, a no-retraction regime would enhance, rather than diminish, their willingness to negotiate. The truth of this counterintuitive argument lies first in the fact
that, while the no-retraction regime curbs a party’s ability to exit
freely, it also provides her with the security that her counterpart will
not exit unilaterally. There is a symmetric upside to participating in a
regime that restricts the freedom to retract.
More importantly, as stated above, the no-retraction regime im44
proves the parties’ incentives to make precontractual investments.
These added investments increase the value that the parties eventually
will divide in the contract, making both of them better off relative to a
regime—such as the all-or-nothing regime—that does not provide
similar reliance incentives. A rule that prohibits retraction from a preliminary representation, so long as it is coupled with reliance liability,
will unambiguously lead the parties to enter into negotiations in more
cases in which there is a potential surplus than they would in the ab45
sence of liability.

44

Supra note 40 and accompanying text.
This proposition is proven formally in Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 12, at
456. To illustrate this effect, consider again the above example, supra notes 39, 40.
Assume now that the seller’s cost is not 0, but 110, and that if the parties enter negotiations, the seller makes an initial proposal of a price, after which the buyer can invest
and negotiations resume. Assume, as before, that the buyer can increase her valuation
from 100 to 150 by investing 30. This is a case where a potential surplus of 10 exists
(150 – 110 – 30 ), but only if the buyer invests.
Under the mutual assent regime, the buyer will not invest. The buyer expects that,
no matter what the seller’s original price proposal was, if she were to invest and increase her valuation to 150, the final price will be set midway between 110 and 150, at
130, thus leaving the buyer with a negative net payoff (150 – 130 – 30 = –10 ). Expecting that the buyer would not invest and that the surplus will remain negative, the parties will not enter negotiations.
Under the no-retraction regime, as long as the seller’s initial proposal did not exceed 120, the buyer will invest. If the buyer invests, the seller cannot demand a price
greater than 120, as this will lead to breakdown in negotiations and liability. Thus, the
price will be set midway between 110 and 120, at 115. This leaves the buyer with a
positive net payoff (150 – 115 – 30 = 5 ) and thus, the investment will be made. The
seller, too, will end up with a positive payoff of 5 (= 115 – 110 ). Expecting the investment and the resulting positive payoffs, the parties will enter negotiations. Hence,
only under this regime will the parties enter negotiations.
45
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Intuitively, the no-retraction regime can be viewed as a commitment device. When parties negotiate a deal, their lack of commitment
and their freedom to walk away chills the incentives of their negotiating
partners to make reliance investments. This lower reliance level produces smaller contractual pies. For the same reason that parties enter
long-term, rather than short-term, contracts—to encourage relationship-specific investment—the no-retraction regime increases the par46
ties’ investment in the relationship, thus increasing the surplus. Indeed, the recognition that precontractual liability enhances the con47
tractual surplus is increasingly prominent in court decisions.
4. Unwanted Transactions
Another concern arising from the parties’ diminished freedom
from contract involves allocative inefficiency: Parties might end up
sticking with unwanted contractual partners and, consequently, miss
out on opportunities to maximize the potential surplus.
There are several ways to address this concern. Note, first, that
parties are not bound to a relationship if it is indeed less efficient than
its alternatives. They can, of course, abandon partners, although they
will effectively have to share with the rejected party a piece of the increased surplus that is created by the more efficient transaction.
To return, though, to the question of allocative efficiency, it is
true that the burden of liability can lead to an inefficient choice of
partner. If, say, the initial negotiation partner invested an amount, R,
in reliance, and a new partner appears, offering a transaction that is
more efficient but not sufficiently so as to enable the initial partner to
recover R and still enjoy a greater surplus, the new partner will not be
accommodated. While this concern is valid, a couple of observations
46

This claim, that the surplus is enhanced under the no-retraction regime, does
not imply that both parties are necessarily better off under the liability rule. It might
well be that the non-investing party, having to negotiate under the potential burden of
liability, is worse off than he would have been under the all-or-nothing regime. This
distributive effect, however, will not distort the incentives to enter negotiations. A
party whose payoff was positive in the absence of liability will not experience a negative
payoff under the no-retraction regime. For a technical proof of this claim, see Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 12, at 456-57.
47
See, e.g., Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 884-85 (Ct.
App. 2002) (claiming that parties should have assurance that their investments in the
negotiations will not be wiped out by the other party’s retractions); see also Venture
Assocs. v. Zenith Data Sys., 96 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[A complex negotiation]
often is costly and time-consuming. The parties may want assurance that their investments . . . will not be wiped out by the other party’s footdragging or change of
heart . . . .”).
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reduce its severity. First, the potential for the emergence of more attractive partners should be taken into account when reliance is invested. The greater this potential, the less that should be invested in
reliance by the initial partner. If courts can limit reliance liability to
reasonable, not actual, reliance, then the amount of reliance that will
be invested when there is a significant chance of a more efficient
48
Second, while reliance by the initial partner
partner is small.
becomes a barrier to efficient contracting when a new partner arrives,
it increases the efficiency of the contract when a new partner does not
arrive. These two observations, taken together, suggest that, if the
likelihood of a new partner is high, reliance is not likely to be great
(and thus not a significant barrier) and, if the likelihood of a new
partner is low, reliance is likely to be elevated, its fruit being enjoyed
with high probability. Thus, the expected loss from unwanted part49
ners is fairly small.
II. DOCTRINAL APPLICATIONS
The consensus principle underlies many of the fundamental doctrines of contract formation. Accordingly, an alternative conception
of liability would affect the way these doctrines are rationalized and
applied. In this Part, I will begin to explore some of the prominent
implications of a no-retraction regime.
A. Assent and Misunderstandings
An illustrative case in which a dispute arises regarding the interpretation of a contract’s language is one of misunderstanding. A

48

When courts can verify the level of reasonable reliance, the investment is contractible and the underinvestment problem can be resolved if the parties expressly
specify the desired level of reliance. Indeed, parties often do, and courts are willing to
protect such agreements. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267,
274 (Wis. 1965) (examining a situation in which the parties agreed specifically on precontractual investments).
49
Formally, let R denote the relationship-specific investment and V(R) the net
surplus function satisfying V ′ > 0 and V ′′ < 0. Assume that there is a probability, π ,
that, after R is sunk, a more efficient relationship will materialize, with a net surplus of
W. The optimal investment, R *, maximizes π W + (1 – π )V(R) – R and is characterized
by the first-order condition (1 – π )V ′(R *) = 1. We can write R * as a function of π , which
satisfies dR*/d π < 0, that is, the higher the probability of W, the lower is the optimal
investment that courts ought to protect. An inefficient transaction occurs when V(R *) <
W < V(R *) + R *; as π increases, R* decreases, and the likelihood of an inefficient transaction—the chance that W will lie between V(R *) and V(R *) + R *—declines (although it
does not reach zero).
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misunderstanding occurs when the parties agreed on a particular
term but dispute its proper meaning. Does a “chicken” mean a young
bird suitable for broiling and frying or an old fowl suitable only for
50
stewing? Does an obligation to deliver cotton via the Peerless ship
mean the vessel carrying this name that sails in October or the one
51
carrying the same name that sails in December? Under the prevailing objective theory of assent, the law seeks to trace and enforce the
more reasonable among the competing meanings. Accordingly, if
one party actually knew at the time of contracting that the other party
attached a different meaning, or had reason to know of the attached
meaning, this party is “at fault” for the misunderstanding. This fault is
thus the basis for tipping the scales in favor of the meaning attached
52
by the other party.
When no party is at fault—i.e., neither knew or had reason to
know of the meaning attached by the other—there is no remaining
basis for tipping the scale, and contractual liability does not arise. Although both parties intended to be bound, in the absence of a clear
way to select among the competing interpretations, both parties are
53
free to walk away, even if one has already performed its obligation.
Formally, this no-enforcement outcome—the only logical solution
under the mutual assent approach—is a neutral solution, biased toward neither of the proposed interpretations, equally barring each
party from enforcing its intended contract. Effectively, however, the
no-enforcement solution is usually favorable to the defendant. If the
dispute is over the existence or nonexistence of an obligation, the noenforcement solution happens to be precisely the outcome favored by
the defendant, who, at the time of trial, claims that no obligation exists.
50

See Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (embodying a contractual misunderstanding of the term “chicken”).
51
See Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375, 376 (Ex. 1864) (resolving a contractual misunderstanding over the meaning of the Peerless ship).
52
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(2) (1981).
53
Id. §§ 20(1)(a), 201(3). There are two ways through which courts reach the noenforcement result. First, the absence of one reasonable interpretation implies that
there is no meeting of the minds and thus no contract, and consequently, none of the
contractual obligations can be enforced. This is the rationale of cases like Raffles, 159
Eng. Rep. 375, but such cases are quite rare. Second, and more common, are cases in
which the plaintiff simply cannot show that her interpretation is more reasonable. In
such circumstances, courts do not imply an absence of a contract, but simply fail to enforce the obligation demanded by the plaintiff. In the procedural standoff with the
defendant, because the plaintiff did not meet the burden of persuasion, the defendant’s position—the meaning she attaches to the contract—prevails. See, e.g., Frigaliment Importing , 190 F. Supp. at 121 (holding that, in order to prevail, the plaintiff has
to sustain the burden of showing that its meaning is more reasonable).
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And even if both parties agree that an obligation exists but merely
dispute its affirmative scope or meaning, it is often in the interest of
one of the parties, in light of changed circumstances, to have no obligation at all.
While these cases of pure misunderstanding are quite rare, they
constitute an important conceptual benchmark of the consensus principle and have served as the point of departure in the study of mutual
54
assent doctrine. It is problematic, then, that under the mutual assent
doctrine, the court reaches a result that matches neither party’s intent. Both parties intended to be bound to something, an intention
that this otherwise logical outcome frustrates.
The no-retraction approach achieves a different result. The existence
of a contract is not at stake, but merely its content. Since there are
two competing interpretations, the outcome under the no-retraction
approach can also be one of the two. Each party has an option to enforce
the deal, but only under the terms intended by the other. Note, paradoxically,
that by giving the plaintiff an option to enforce a contract based on
the meaning assigned by the defendant, the pro-defendant bias inherent in the no-contract result is actually diminished. The defendant
cannot escape the deal altogether—an outcome she might, in light of
changed circumstances or opportunistic motives, prefer—but must
yield to the plaintiff’s power to enforce the deal as she, the defendant,
intended it.
To illustrate the economic sense of a no-retraction approach, con55
sider the Peerless ship case. A contract for the sale of cotton provided
for the shipment to be on a vessel identified as the Peerless, sailing
from Bombay to Liverpool. The buyer intended the shipment to arrive on the Peerless vessel that departed in October, while the seller intended the shipment to arrive on the Peerless vessel that departed in
56
December. When the December Peerless arrived, the buyer refused
to accept the seller’s shipment, and the seller sued. Unable to pick
the more reasonable interpretation, the court held—and many commentators consider this an inevitable and logical implication of the
mutual assent doctrine—that no contract existed and the buyer right57
fully rejected the shipment.
54

See, e.g., MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 36-38 (4th ed. 2001) (introducing the consensus ad idem principle by describing the Peerless case).
55
Raffles, 159 Eng. Rep. 375.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 376.
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Unfortunately, the no-contract outcome allowed the buyer to es58
cape a speculative contract opportunistically. The no-retraction approach would have elegantly avoided this undesirable result. The
buyer-defendant, who claimed to have assigned a different meaning to
the shipment term, would not have been forced to accept the seller’s
meaning, but at the same time would not have been able to retract
from his own meaning. The seller-plaintiff could choose whether to
accept the deal as the buyer intended it—that is, according to the October terms—or to not enforce it at all. Given the facts of this case,
the seller would surely have opted to enforce the deal under the
buyer’s terms. The existence of two plausible meanings should not
have led to the one result nobody intended, namely, no contract.
The result arising from the no-retraction principle is consistent
with another solution courts have crafted when unable to select a
meaning that is more reasonable, a solution that accords with the procedural allocation of the burden of persuasion. Consider, for example, a deal involving the sale of chicken, with a misunderstanding between the seller and the buyer over what quality of chicken was
59
required. In a suit by the buyer, who expected a higher quality of
chicken than the one intended (and delivered) by the seller, the seller
prevailed since the buyer was unable to prove that her interpretation
was more reasonable.60 This is consistent with the no-retraction approach: A contract exists, but the buyer can only enforce the terms
that the seller intended, not the terms as she intended. Even though
58

Brian Simpson’s historical account of this case makes it fairly clear that the
buyer-defendant acted opportunistically. A. W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE
COMMON LAW 151-53 (1996). It turns out that the buyer, who intended for the cotton
to arrive on the October Peerless, never explicitly requested delivery when the October
Peerless arrived, two months before the seller made his own tender attempt. Id. at 152.
Simpson demonstrates that the buyer lost interest in the entire transaction since the
spot price of cotton dropped between the time the contract was formed and the arrival
of the October ship, from 17¼d to 15¼d per barrel. Id. The contract, which was an
instrument of financial speculation on future prices, turned out to be a losing deal for
the buyer, who could now acquire the same cotton on the spot market for significantly
less. In fact, by the time the December vessel arrived, the spot price recovered back up
to almost 17d. That is, the buyer’s loss would have been 2d per barrel under his own
interpretation of the contract, but only ¼d per barrel under the seller’s interpretation.
The buyer wanted the obligation to be dismissed, not because of the meaning the
seller attributed, but rather because circumstances changed and the contract turned
out to be unprofitable.
59
This example is modeled after Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International
Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
60
See id. at 121 (noting that both meanings could be grounded in objective definitions of the disputed term and that, as a result, the plaintiff did not sustain the burden
of showing that his meaning should prevail).
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there was no meeting of the minds, and even without supplementing
the disputed term with a court-drafted one, the obligation is enforceable in accordance with the dual-option logic. The terms enforced
are the ones intended by the party who turns out to be the defendant.
Note, though, that a Frigaliment-type result is reached under rules
of procedure rather than principles of contract. The court enforces a
contract and chooses its terms even though there is no mutual assent
and no clear way to select the more reasonable interpretation. Had
the substantive assent doctrine been applied, rather than the procedural rule, it would have mandated a Peerless-type result of no con61
tract. A contractual obligation was enforced, in this case, despite the
substantive assent doctrine, and solely because of the rules of procedure. (One can imagine a different scenario in which the seller is the
plaintiff, seeking payment for delivery that the buyer rejects; there,
the court might rule against the seller, as he too would fail to meet the
burden of persuasion.) The results in Peerless and Frigaliment expose,
therefore, a tension between the substantive law of assent and the
procedural law of contract dispute resolution. The no-retraction approach overcomes this tension. It provides the missing contracttheoretical basis for Frigaliment’s decision to enforce a version of the
contract that depends on the identity of the defendant. It thus unifies
the procedural and substantive perspectives, which can otherwise lead
to conflicting results.
B. Precontractual Agreements and the Contract/No-Contract Boundary
During the course of negotiations, parties often reach preliminary
understandings acknowledged by handshakes, written memoranda,
and the like. At times, these understandings explicitly state that the
parties do not intend to be bound until further agreement is reached.
Often, however, the existence of intent to be bound is ambiguous and
is inferred from surrounding circumstances, such as the comprehensiveness of the understanding. What sets these understandings
apart from regular, enforceable contracts is their manifest incompleteness or the fact that the parties have made it clear that they are intended to be supplemented via further negotiations.

61

Indeed, a year after issuing the Frigaliment Importing decision, Judge Henry
Friendly admitted that the case might better have been decided on substantive assent
grounds. Dadourain Exp. Corp. v. United States, 291 F.2d 178, 187 n.4 (2d Cir. 1961)
(Friendly, J., dissenting).
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Precontractual agreements and agreements to agree pose a difficult adjudicative task under the mutual assent doctrine. On the one
hand, it is clear that some consensus has been reached and some
commitment made; thus, allowing the parties to walk away freely
would frustrate their initial accomplishment. On the other hand, the
parties have made it clear that additional agreement needs to be
reached before there is a “contract,” and thus, enforcing their precontractual understanding as if it were a contract (and filling its gaps with
court-imposed reasonable terms) would deprive the parties of the
power they sought to maintain—to reject unfavorable additional
terms. Courts, forced to abide by the contract/no-contract dichotomy
of the mutual assent doctrine, have found it difficult to reach consis62
tent decisions. Adjudication in this field has been criticized as “con63
64
65
fusing,” “inconsistent,” “all over the board,” and the “least predict66
67
able” in the entire area of contract law.
Given this unpredictable pattern under the mutual assent regime,
the no-retraction principle has the potential of providing a framework
for a more consistent treatment of precontractual agreements. Under
62

In the area of lease contracts, for example, one court has noted that the decisions dealing with agreements to agree are “in hopeless conflict.” Walker v. Keith, 382
S.W.2d 198, 199 (Ky. 1964).
63
Buechler, supra note 14, at 574.
64
Temkin, supra note 14, at 130 n.23.
65
Stephen R. Volk, The Letter of Intent, 16 INST. ON SEC. REG. 143, 464 (1986).
66
See Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 259-60 (declaring that “[i]t would be difficult
to find a less predictable area of contract law”).
67
This confusion can be illustrated by comparing the decisions in two leading
cases, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987), and R.G. Group,
Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1984). In both cases, the parties
reached an agreement on a substantial portion, but not all, of the terms and acknowledged that they had an “agreement-in-principle,” Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at 791, or “handshake deal,” R.G. Group, 751 F.2d at 73. In each situation, one party retracted, not because it was dissatisfied by the resolution of the missing terms, but rather because it was
seeking opportunistic gain, against its previously stated intent. R.G. Group, 751 F.2d at
74; Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at 786. In Texaco, the court found that the deal was enforceable
as a contract and awarded damages of record-setting magnitude. Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at
795, 866. In R.G. Group, on the other hand, the court found that the deal was unenforceable and awarded no damages. R.G. Group, 751 F.2d at 79. The court in R.G.
Group reasoned that in a complex deal with so much at stake—in that case, a 25-branch
franchise agreement amounting to millions of dollars—“it would be unusual to rely on
an oral understanding,” and thus, “a requirement that the agreement be in writing and
signed simply cannot be a surprise to anyone.” Id. at 77. Ironically, although in Texaco, the stakes and the complexity were far greater—a sale of control in a giant oil conglomerate with a complex ownership structure, where damages exceeded $10 billion—
the court found that intent to be bound could be manifested even prior to the memorialization of all the details into the written agreement. Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at 795.
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the no-retraction approach, parties would be bound to the terms of
the precontractual understanding. But unlike standard contracts,
these precontractual agreements would not be supplemented by “reasonable” gap-fillers. Instead, each party would have the option to enforce a contract that contains the agreed-upon terms, supplemented
with terms proposed by, or most favorable (within reason) to the
other party. Thus, each party has the option to enforce upon the
other party a full agreement that is at least as profitable as the other
party had plausibly envisioned when entering the precontractual
agreement.
The no-retraction approach, when implemented through this dualoption devise, provides an intermediate, rather than all-or-nothing,
liability consequence to the parties’ precontractual agreement (simi68
lar, again, to Fuller’s “sliding scale of enforceability”). There are different levels of intensity to precontractual agreements: they can lie
anywhere on a continuum between very preliminary to almost full
consensus. A regime that focuses only on extremes and restricts the
legal outcome to either full expectation liability or no liability at all
can rarely reflect the varied tones of parties’ partial understanding
along this continuum. It also leads the parties to make less-thanoptimal reliance decisions. And being so inherently unpredictable, it
adds a component of risk that might chill the incentives of parties to
reach partial agreements. In contrast, under the no-retraction regime, the burden of liability is proportional to the intensity of the
agreement. When very few terms are included in the preliminary
agreement, the option that each party has to enforce a contract is
relatively less burdensome to the other party, since the many missing
terms are supplemented in a way most favorable to the other party. As
more terms are contained in the agreement, less one-sided supplementation is needed and the option each party has becomes more
burdensome to the other party. When the precontractual understanding is comprehensive and needs no supplementation, the option
to enforce it converges with standard contractual liability.
Another way to view the continuity property of the no-retraction
regime is to compare the terms of the deal contained in the options
that two parties have. A preliminary agreement is, in effect, two contracts, each containing a different set of supplemented terms, with
each party having the option to enforce only one of them. When the

68

See sources cited supra note 1 (pressing for an ascending liability scheme that
would be based on different measures of damages).
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preliminary agreement contains very few terms, the two contracts are
very different from each other. As more terms are contained in the
preliminary agreement and less one-sided supplementation is required, the two contracts converge until, when the preliminary understanding is comprehensive, the two contracts become identical.
C. Good Faith in Negotiations
The gradual rise of liability under the no-retraction principle provides a systematic foundation for one of the more ambiguous doctrines in contract law—the requirement to negotiate in good faith. In
the presence of precontractual agreements, and especially in the
presence of an “agreement to agree,” courts have increasingly regulated the freedom from contract. While deciding not to enforce these
agreements as full-blown contracts, courts require the parties to con69
tinue negotiations in a bona fide attempt to reach a full agreement.
In addition, they tailor some measure of reliance liability to a breach
70
of this duty. It is not clear, however, what the duty to continue negotiations in good faith requires. As a result, the parties are left uncertain as to what type of bargaining tactic might be deemed unreasonable. The no-retraction approach can resolve this ambiguity.
For the good faith duty to be instrumental in inducing optimal
precontractual reliance, the negotiation tactics ought to conform, at
the very least, to the no-retraction principle developed here. A party
would be deemed in violation of the duty if she retracts from terms
she previously agreed to or if she refuses to accept new terms offered
by the other party that are the most favorable terms for which she can
reasonably hope. Refusal to contract under such terms manifests a
motivation to break, rather than successfully culminate, the negotiations, and thus exhibits bad faith.
Consequently, if a party insists on terms that exceed standard or average market terms and refuses to accept reasonable, split-the-difference
69

See, e.g., Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491,
499 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that a commitment letter represented a binding preliminary agreement and, thus, obligated both parties to seek to conclude a final agreement
by negotiating in good faith).
70
See, e.g., Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 73-74 (2d Cir.
1989) (discussing how a party may be liable for out-of-pocket expenses based on a
breach of its duty of good faith); Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d
875, 885 (Ct. App. 2002) (“[D]amages for breach of a contract to negotiate an agreement are measured by the injury the plaintiff suffered in relying on the defendant to
negotiate in good faith. This measure encompasses the plaintiff’s out-of-pocket costs
in conducting the negotiations . . . .”).
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proposals from her counterpart, this is not a bad faith negotiation
71
practice and should not give rise to liability. In line with the noretraction principle, this party has not retracted from actual or constructive previous representations. But when the other party caves in
and concedes all the contested issues, either in accordance with this
party’s previous demands or in accordance with the best alternative
this party can potentially find elsewhere, then the refusal of this party
72
to finalize a deal can be construed as bad faith conduct. Put differently, one way to determine bad faith is to assess the terms that are not
proposed. The defendant would want to show that there exist some
more favorable terms that were not proposed and that are within the
reasonable domain; the plaintiff would want to show that any term
more favorable to the defendant beyond what was proposed is not
reasonably attainable. In contrast to much of the good faith jurisprudence, this approach determines whether the defendant’s negotiation
position is in good or bad faith not by the value of this position to the
73
plaintiff, but rather by its value to the defendant. To be sure, there
are many ethical factors that bear on the issue of what is bad faith in
negotiations. This analysis does not exhaust such inquiry. The point
here is more limited: To the extent that the social concern is to encourage parties to rely on and invest in the negotiations, the good
faith obligation can be instrumental in promoting this goal. In fact,
all that is required is a fairly lenient good faith standard, placing a
minimal burden on the parties. If parties are precluded from rejecting their own most favorable terms, optimal reliance would ensue.

71

See, e.g., PSI Energy, Inc. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 17 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir.
1994) (holding that a coal supplier had not negotiated in bad faith by insisting on a
price that was above the market price).
72
This principle was rejected in Roberts v. Adams, 330 P.2d 900, 902 (Cal. Ct. App.
1958) (finding no violation of the duty to negotiate in good faith when parties failed to
agree on terms of payment, despite the plaintiff’s willingness to pay the entire price in
cash upfront). See also A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium for Specialpraeparater v.
I.M.C. Chem. Group, Inc., 873 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding no violation of
the duty to negotiate in good faith when a party refused to approve a deal that granted
all the contested issues in its favor). In the latter case, however, the concession was
made after the agreed-upon, sixty-day term to negotiate expired. Id. at 156.
73
For the view that bad faith should be assessed by the value of the terms to the
plaintiff, see White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1958) (examining the value
of the defendant’s offer to the plaintiff in order to determine whether the defendant
negotiated in bad faith); Eisenberg, supra note 33, at 1810 (asserting that good faith
requires a party to accept a fair implication of any agreed-upon term); Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 277 (highlighting potential examples of unfair dealing by focusing on
the value of proposals to the conceding party).
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D. The Requirement of Definiteness
The requirement that the agreement be definite is another implication of the mutual assent principle. When the agreement fails to
include important terms, it is difficult to determine whether mutual
assent was reached. When there is no sound basis to infer what terms
the parties might have wanted, the presumption of consent is refuted
and no remedy can be provided. To hold otherwise is to “make the
contract over” and undermine the privilege of consent that the de74
fendant reserved. The choice under existing law is, again, between
75
no contract and a full-blown supplemented contract.
The common law has traditionally tended toward the no-contract
outcome. For example, a landlord who granted a tenant an option to
extend a lease at a price to be agreed upon was not bound in the re76
newal period; his promise was deemed insufficiently definite. This
traditional result has been weakened under the Uniform Commercial
Code’s (the Code) “contract with open terms” approach, that more
aggressively supplements the parties’ agreement with reasonable or
77
majoritarian terms, including price terms. Nevertheless, both traditional common law and the Code share the premise that the problem
is dichotomous: either a full-blown contract can be assembled with
the aid of gap-fillers, or no contract exists at all.
In contrast, under the no-retraction principle, a promise that is
insufficiently definite can give rise to an intermediate result. The
party who seeks enforcement of the incomplete agreement is granted
an option to enforce the transaction supplemented with terms that
are the most favorable (within reason) to the other party. The tenant,
in the above example, could enforce a lease extension under the
74

See Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 470,
471 (N.Y. 1923) (presenting Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s famous dictum, “We are told
that the defendant was under a duty . . . to accept a term that would be reasonable . . . . To hold it to such a standard would be to make the contract over”).
75
To illustrate this dichotomy, consider the opinions in Sun Printing, 139 N.E. 470.
An agreement left the price of future installments open, to be resolved in later negotiations. When a finalized agreement was not reached, but after the parties performed
some of the immediate obligations, the parties disagreed as to whether there was a
binding contract. The court split between two views. The majority, led by Judge Cardozo, reversed the appellate court and held that no binding obligation existed. Id. at
342. Meanwhile, the dissent, led by Judge Frederick Crane, argued that the court
could supplement the agreement with a reasonable and fair provision. Id. at 350-51
(Crane, J., dissenting).
76
Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541, 544 (N.Y.
1981).
77
U.C.C. § 2-305 (2003).
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landlord’s most favorable price index—a price no lower than what the
landlord could have sought when the agreement was to be reached.
This option is not equivalent to enforcing the indefinite promise
as a contract. The gaps, under this option approach, are filled with
terms different than the average/majoritarian terms. Using such majoritarian terms would impose obligations on the defendant that she
has not willed. Instead, the missing terms must be such that the completed deal is guaranteed to be no worse than what the retracting
party could have presumptively intended when the incomplete promise was made, and it is enforced only if the promisee so chooses.
Indeed, in some situations, courts overcome the indefiniteness of
the agreement, using a “cure by concession” technique that is effectively identical to the no-retraction regime. A party that seeks to enforce an agreement can concede the missing terms by accepting terms
78
that are the most favorable to the other party. In his landmark deci79
sion in Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co.,
Judge Benjamin Cardozo makes reference to such a technique:
If price and nothing more had been left open for adjustment, there
might be force in the contention that the buyer would be viewed, in the
light of later provisions, as the holder of an option. This would mean
that [the buyer] . . . would have the privilege of calling for delivery in ac80
cordance with a price established as a maximum.

Cardozo, however, rejects this approach in his decision. Thus, while
some courts have overcome the problem of indefiniteness in this
81
way, this approach is by no means universal. The following Section

78

See FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, § 3.29, at 219 (explaining “cure by consen-

sus”).
79

139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923).
Id. at 470 (citation omitted).
81
For example, when parties left the payment terms “to be agreed upon,” courts
have allowed the buyer to “concede” the full payment in cash and with no delay,
namely, in a manner most favorable to the seller. See, e.g., Morris v. Ballard, 16 F.2d
175, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (concluding that the purchaser could enforce a deal that
had not resolved the terms of payment if he was ready to pay the agreed price under
such terms as the vendor might impose); Matlack v. Arend, 63 A.2d 812, 817 (N.J.
1949) (stating that if the buyer “waives all credit and offers to pay cash, the defense
that the agreement is too indefinite is untenable”). It is not that courts perceive the
full payment in cash as the reasonable term that the parties intended. In fact, oftentimes it is quite clear that the parties hoped to agree on installment or credit terms.
Rather, courts regard the buyer’s willingness to make full payment in cash as a waiver
that “obviate[s] any need to come to any agreement as to the manner and form of
payment.” Shull v. Sexton, 390 P.2d 313, 318 (Colo. 1964).
80
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discusses the instances in which using this gap-filling approach would
be desirable.
E. Filling Gaps in Incomplete Agreements
The no-retraction regime’s solution to the problem of incomplete representation—the option each party has to enforce a contract
supplemented by terms most favorable to the other side—can be
viewed as a basis for a different principle of gap-filling in incomplete
agreements. In contrast to the “mimic the parties’ will” approach that
fills gaps with reasonable or majoritarian terms, and also in contrast to
the information-forcing default rule that fills gaps in a way that minimizes information and communication costs, the no-retraction approach selects “pro-defendant” defaults: one-sided terms most favorable to the enforced-against party. Such default provisions are not
aimed at minimizing contract-drafting costs (as are the mimicking defaults), nor do they purport to regulate the information flow during
the negotiations (as do “penalty” defaults). Instead, they monitor the
parties’ decisions to exit negotiations and retract from earlier representations. Moreover, if they are coupled with the reliance measure of
liability, they can efficiently regulate precontractual reliance decisions.
This gap-filling approach provides a solution to a problem that is
one of the least-theorized sources of contractual incompleteness: par82
ties’ inability to agree over a disputed issue. In these situations, in
order to avoid a breakdown in the negotiations and a collapse of the
relationship, parties may choose to leave the issue open or resolve it in
ambiguous terms. This incompleteness has little to do with drafting
costs (in fact, ambiguity is often more expensive to draft), nor with
asymmetric information. The all-or-nothing approach and standard
gap-filling techniques would clearly violate the parties’ choice to reserve mutual veto power on the resolution of the disputed issue.
In fact, any gap-filling approach that utilizes definitive default provisions would, if anticipated by the parties, have the ex ante effect of
precluding them from leaving an issue unresolved. The biased supplementation approach under the no-retraction regime, which effectively provides a dual -provision default—with its content depending
on the identity of the party seeking enforcement—is consistent with

82

See, e.g., OLIVER HART & JOHN MOORE, AGREEING NOW TO AGREE LATER: CONTRACTS THAT RULE OUT BUT DO NOT RULE IN (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W10397, 2004) (offering a theoretical model of agreements that are designed deliberately incomplete).
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the parties’ strategic choice to disagree. In a sense, under this regime,
the parties can agree ex ante that the unresolved issue will never provide a basis for a unilateral decision to exit the deal, since the other
party has an option to concede it, and they can do so without actually
resolving the issue. The decoupled default terms enable parties to
83
create an obligation without mutual assent.
F. The Mechanics of Offer and Acceptance
Consensus theory is the foundation of the offer-and-acceptance
model of contract formation. If the parties have to reach consensus in
order to create contractual liability, then it is necessary to identify two
communications that manifest identical terms, and before such a contemporaneous union of communications occurs, both parties must be
84
free to walk away. Thus, doctrines that address the relations between
communications that are either non-identical or that create timing issues, such as revocation of offers, counteroffers, and battles of forms,
among others, are all corollaries of the consensus principle. Accordingly, a liability regime that does not build this principle and does not
require consensus would have numerous implications for the legal
consequences of the offer, acceptance, and other precontractual communications.
Before examining these implications, however, a point of caution
is in order. The offer-and-acceptance model of contract formation
is not always a useful representation of the negotiation process. In
fact, under the premise that motivates much of the analysis throughout this Essay—that mutual assent is reached piecemeal—the offerand-acceptance model is quite synthetic. There is not a single communication in which a party sets forth the comprehensive list of terms
it desires, to which the other party says “I accept.” Instead, communications proceed in many rounds, each relating to a different aspect of
the deal. Full-blown offers or counteroffers, if they exist, only trail
and memorialize a course of partial understandings. Nevertheless, if
the no-retraction idea is to have a general appeal, it must apply to the
83

The argument that parties are often interested in this type of unresolved or interim commitment is developed more fully in a companion paper, Ben-Shahar, supra
note 8.
84
See Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng. Rep. 250, 251 (K.B. 1818) (“The defendants
must be considered in law as making . . . the same identical offer to the plaintiffs; and
then the contract is completed by the acceptance of it by the latter.”); Simpson, supra
note 2, at 258-62 (discussing the historical evolution of the offer-and-acceptance doctrine).
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simple transactions in which communications do fit within the offer/acceptance metaphorical framework. Accordingly, the following
is a tentative exploration of a few implications of the no-retraction
approach.
1. Doctrines that Permit Costless Retraction
Under the mutual assent regime, a party that manifested its willingness to enter an agreement under some terms can freely retract as
long as the other party has not accepted these same terms. Thus, if
the communication amounts to what the law deems to be an “offer,”
current doctrine establishes that it can be withdrawn at no cost before
the intent to be bound becomes mutual, namely, any time prior to ac85
ceptance. Under the no-retraction principle, however, retraction in
such circumstances is not free, particularly if the other party relied on
the proposal. The offeror who revokes the offer must reimburse the
offeree at least for the reliance investment incurred after the offer was
made. Similarly, if the communication does not amount to an “offer”
but is merely a solicitation of offers, or an invitation to deal, current
doctrine allows the soliciting party to retract prior to (and even after)
the response by the other party, whereas the no-retraction regime will
impose liability on the soliciting party who is now unwilling to deal
under the terms she solicited.
In some contexts, the law already recognizes mild versions of a noretraction principle. When a subcontractor makes a bid, which the
general contractor uses in computing her own bid, the subcontractor
86
cannot revoke his terms, even before they are affirmatively accepted.
It is not consent that creates liability, but a one-sided, relied-upon
proposal.
The no-free-revocation rule raises several potential concerns. First,
each party might be less willing to communicate proposals and would
85

U.C.C. § 2-205 (2003); Petterson v. Pattberg, 161 N.E. 428, 429 (N.Y. 1928)
(holding that an offer is revocable anytime before acceptance even though the offeree
incurs costs in reliance).
86
Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 759-60 (Cal. 1958). Some courts have
criticized this deviation from the mutual assent regime for its one-sided liability, exposing subcontractors to bid shopping and bid chopping. See, e.g., Pavel Enters., Inc. v.
A.S. Johnson Co., 674 A.2d 521, 528 (Md. 1996) (noting that Drennan’s reasoning has
been criticized based on the fact that subcontractors are bound to general contractors
but general contractors are not bound to subcontractors). These courts have not recognized, however, the possibility of applying the no-retraction regime bilaterally. General contractors, too, can be barred from retracting: once they incorporate the subcontractor’s offer into their own bid, they may not retract.
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prefer to wait for the other party to put forth a non-retractable proposal, thus preserving its own freedom to walk away cost-free. This
problem could be particularly severe in situations where parties
expect that new information will affect their willingness to transact.
Further, parties might hesitate to enter negotiations, reducing the incidence of efficient contracting.
As a general theoretical matter, this concern is not valid. Recall,
first, that if, in light of fresh information, a party wishes to revoke a
proposal, she can still do so under the no-retraction regime, but at a
cost. The only difference between the no-retraction regime and the
consensus regimes is who bears the cost of reliance sunk prior to the
proposer’s retraction. A party who, in the course of negotiations, acquired new information, can revise her offer, or even dissolve the relationship, but if this retraction leads to a negotiation breakdown, she
87
must reimburse her counterpart’s expenses. As argued above, this
added cost of retraction would increase, not reduce, the payoff from
contracting to both parties, including the proposing party. True, the
latter must bear a cost of potential liability for retraction. This cost,
however, is more than offset by the benefit she derives from the increased reliance investment by her negotiation partner. Namely, under the no-retraction regime, negotiating partners have the greater
security that their counterparts will not retract and walk away from
previous proposals, and in the presence of this enhanced security they
will have a greater incentive to make precontractual specific investments. These investments, in turn, increase the surplus that both parties end up dividing via the contract. Thus, the proposing party, by
surrendering the absolute freedom to retract, energizes the opponent’s investment and eventually enjoys the larger contractual pie.
For example, a subcontractor is better off when his bid is irrevocable,
because the general contractor is more likely to rely on this bid and to
88
incorporate it into her own bid.
Another concern has to do with a party’s ability to make concurrent proposals to numerous potential partners, where a contract can
be entered into with, at most, one of the respondents. Would the
proposing party be liable to respondents who are turned down for
their response costs? Would such liability deter parties from making
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Supra Part I.E.3.
See Drennan, 333 P.2d at 760 (arguing that the subcontractor benefits by having
his bid irrevocable and thereby enabling the contractor to rely on it).
88
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concurrent proposals or from soliciting concurrent bids from multiple
parties?
The answer to this concern turns on what is deemed a retraction
in the presence of multi-party bids. If it is clear that the intent of the
soliciting party is to deal eventually with only one of the respondents,
then the original proposal to the multiple parties can be understood
to include an implicit condition that no more than one of the responses can lead to a deal. Thus, to avoid the burden of excessive liability, the soliciting party need not opt out of the no-retraction regime, but merely clarify to the recipients (if it is not already clear) that
the solicitation is not exclusive. Recall that the same problem arises
under the mutual assent regime, when more than one party responds
to an advertisement. The common law resolves this problem by classi89
fying the advertisement as an “invitation” rather than an “offer.” The
90
advertisement is not open for all recipients to accept. Here, a retraction does occur if, say, the soliciting party insists on terms different
than ones she initially set out, rejects all the responses that conform to
the solicitation’s terms, or does not fairly consider one of the bids.
But a retraction does not occur if the soliciting party is rejecting the
91
invited responses after impartially accepting one of the bids.
A further concern that the no-retraction regime may raise has to
do with the expiration of precontractual proposals. How long must a
party, who made a proposal, wait before she can walk away from the
negotiations without bearing liability for retraction? Surely, the proposal cannot be open indefinitely, binding the proposing party forever. Under the current regime, a party who made a proposal but
then seeks to terminate the negotiations can freely revoke the proposal. Under the no-retraction regime, this course of action is not
available, raising concerns that parties would be bound even when the
negotiations turned stale.
This concern can be dealt with by defining the retraction restrictions with greater precision. Recall that the limitation on retraction is
meant to prevent opportunistic retractions that are associated with
holdups. Retractions that are a result of impasse—of exhausted bargaining and a sincere futility of negotiations—should not be grounds
89

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26, cmt. b, illus. 1 (1981).
Id. cmt. c (“In determining whether an offer is made, relevant factors include
the . . . number of persons to whom the communication is addressed.”).
91
For a similar understanding of the obligation to entertain bids, see Heyer Prods.
Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409, 413 (Ct. Cl. 1956); Farnsworth, supra note 11, at
238-39.
90
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for liability. In the same fashion that current law determines the
length of time that unrestricted offers, if not revoked, remain open,
no-retraction doctrine can determine the length of time that proposals cannot be revoked. For example, the existing default rule estab92
lishes that an offer expires after a reasonable length of time. Such a
rule, if applicable and effective under a regime that permits free affirmative retraction, may also be applicable under a regime that does
93
not permit free retraction. The offeror’s interest to be free from futile negotiations can be addressed by shortening the term that is considered “reasonable” for an offer to remain open. Of course, the offeror may retract even earlier and, to the extent that the offeree has
not yet relied, do so without bearing any liability.
In general, it might be feared that a no-retraction regime, by reducing each party’s unilateral control over the termination of the negotiations, would introduce more uncertainty into the negotiations
stage. Note, though, that the diminished freedom to retract may only
increase, rather than reduce, the parties’ certainty as to their position.
Under this regime the parties know that serious precontractual statements lead to certain intermediate liability. In contrast, under the
current regime, parties are often uncertain whether their communications have put them in the realm of contract. The variance inherent
in this binary regime, where legal consequences are either null or
harsh, is eliminated by the no-retraction regime.
To be sure, transactors who are accustomed to the free-retraction
regime might be intimidated by the no-retraction principle and, as
a result, instinctively opt out of it. Such a reaction, however, can at
most confirm how deep-rooted the consensus principle is in the existing legal folklore. It cannot rationalize the consensus principle or
94
its free-retraction corollary. Indeed, under different legal systems,
92

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 41 (1981) (stating that an offeree’s
power of acceptance will lapse after a reasonable amount of time unless the offer states
otherwise).
93
A similar approach applies to contract negotiations under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000). Negotiations toward a collective
bargain can be terminated, and offers withdrawn, if they have reached an “impasse.” A
substantial body of case law defined the terms under which such withdrawal can occur.
See Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 282-83 (discussing the “impasse” concept as it relates
to breaking off negotiations).
94
Indeed, the requirement of mutual consent—and the need for an offer and an
acceptance—has been so deeply rooted in the intuitions of scholars and transactors
alike that it has often been packed into the definition of contract. James Gordley argues convincingly that there is not a single satisfactory philosophical account as to why
an offer cannot be conceived differently, for example, as a commitment that is binding
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offers are considered irrevocable unless the offeror expressly stated
95
otherwise.
2. Doctrines That Deal with Nonconforming Communications
When parties exchange communications that do not manifest a
consensus, e.g., counteroffers, forms containing different material
terms, and the like, the mutual assent regime assigns all-or-nothing legal consequences to their negotiations. On the “nothing” side, under
the rigid “mirror-image” rule of the common law, an offeree who accepts most of the terms and adds or modifies others is presumed to
reject the original offer, thereby terminating her power of acceptance.
Namely, the original offer expires, and the original offeror is free to
96
walk away. Even under the less rigid approach of the Code, an offeree who is adding or modifying material terms in response to an offer is rejecting the offer and, unless the offer is renewed, can no
97
longer accept the rejected terms. On the “all” side, if the parties’
conduct recognizes the existence of a contract, provisions are filled in
98
liberally.
Under the no-retraction rule, nonconforming communications,
whether counteroffers or concurrent proposals, do not automatically
cancel out, but are instead baselines that each party sets for the other
to accept. This exchange of proposals mode of negotiations represents the prototypical case of gradual convergence of the wills. It is
a continuous process whose essence, as argued in Part I, justifies
99
a “convergent” liability regime. Thus, neither party can unilaterally
walk away from the terms it offered, unless the terms are affirmatively

unless and until it is rejected by the other party. GORDLEY, supra note 20, at 175-80,
234.
95
See, e.g., Franco Ferrary, A Comparative Overview on Offer and Acceptance Inter
Absentes, 10 B.U. INT’L L.J. 171, 189-90 (1992) (observing that in Germany, Austria,
Switzerland, and Portugal, an offer is considered irrevocable). In Germany, an offer is
irrevocable after it has been received by the offeree, and it may provide that some elements are left to the determination of the offeree. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH
§§ 130(1), 315 (2000).
96
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 36(1)(a) (1981) (“[The] offeree’s
power of acceptance may be terminated by rejection or counter-offer . . . .”); see also
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Columbia Rolling-Mill Co., 119 U.S. 149, 152 (1886)
(determining that, after making a counteroffer that was not accepted, the plaintiff
could not fall back on the defendant’s original offer).
97
U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2003).
98
§ 2-207(3).
99
See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing how the no-retraction regime creates convergent liability).
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rejected. As a default, a counteroffer need not be deemed a rejection,
but merely a basis for a reverse option. Following the counteroffer,
each party has the power of acceptance. In particular, the original offeror may either accept the counteroffer or refine its previous offer,
but cannot retract by insisting on more aggressive terms.
A party has, to be sure, a right to terminate the negotiations following a rejection of its offer. As in the case of multiple concurrent respondents, where turning down one and choosing another bidder is
not a retraction, in the case of multiple sequential respondents, the offeror can turn and deal with a subsequent partner after the initial one
rejected the offer. This last observation highlights the proper scope
of the no-retraction regime. It is not designed to override parties’ legitimate motivation to exit negotiations. A party that makes representations of terms may still turn around and refuse to deal if her partner
delayed his response unreasonably, rejected her offer outright, or in
any other way failed to manifest his acceptance of the offer. Violations of the no-retraction principle occur, in principle, only if the refusal to deal under the previously represented terms is part of a bargaining strategy that aims at capturing a bigger share of the surplus
than previously conceded.
CONCLUSION
This Essay explores an alternative to one of the fundamental
building blocks of the law of contract formation—the requirement of
mutual assent. It does not propose any change in the type of liability
that emerges when assent exists, but rather it explores an intermediate species of liability that could emerge when mutual assent does not
exist, prior to consensus. It shows that the two regimes converge
when a consensus over terms exists; it is only when full consensus is
lacking that the two regimes diverge.
The analysis in this Essay focuses on one type of justification for
the no-retraction liability regime, namely, an economic justification
emphasizing reliance incentives. It identifies reliance damages as the
optimal measure of damages for retraction from precontractual representations. It argues, however, that the no-retraction regime could
conceptually be coupled with various measures of damages and tailored to promote other objectives of the transacting parties. Surely,
other contracting goals and social concerns can be affected by a shift
from an all-or-nothing regime to a continuous scale of enforceability,
and they may rationalize other remedies.
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In comparison to the existing assent doctrines of contract law,
the no-retraction principle provides a different approach to many
fundamental problems of contract formation. Our brief transdoctrinal
journey in Part II demonstrates that under the no-retraction approach,
the legal resolution of mutual mistakes, precontractual agreements,
conflicting proposals, and more generally, gaps in incomplete contracts, would be different than the existing order under the familiar
assent regime.
The analysis in this Essay, being exploratory in nature, is admittedly lacking in rigor and in nuance. As a substitute to the mutual assent “pillar” of contract law, the no-retraction principle potentially
applies to numerous contexts, with implications to many doctrines,
none of which were treated with sufficient detail here. A more complete defense of the no-retraction regime would also have to identify
reasons why the consensus principle prevailed, historically. Accordingly, the analysis here is offered, not as a basis for reform, but as an
inquiry into some basic conceptions underlying our legal tradition. It
remains for future work to explore the extent to which the approach
developed in this Essay has the horsepower to resolve pragmatically the
problems that have proven difficult for current doctrine and to examine whether these solutions advance the various social objectives associated with contract formation.

